Political parties aren't part of or even named in the Canadian Constitution, and I'd prefer to keep it that way. We already grant political partisans far too much influence over major decisions in this country. As this column suggests, Canadians need to put more effort into figuring out *who* they want representing them, not just picking the candidate with a particular party behind their name. It's also great to have that opportunity: it allows voters to reject loathsome partisan figures who are popular within a party. In many proportional representation systems, those people keep getting elected because they're picked from a party list.
Indeed. And among other things, one does wonder how the solution to 'political parties are bad creatures that turn MPs into mouthpieces of the PMO' would be 'so we should make them even more important to the process, in fact more important than the individual MP in any way.'
Floor crossing in a Westminster style parliament can be defended on the basis that elected representatives are meant to exercise independent judgment, not simply act as agents of their party. As Ms. Van Geyn points out, this idea is rooted in the thinking of Edmund Burke, who argued that a representative owes constituents their reasoned judgment rather than blind obedience. If a party shifts its platform, breaks commitments, or adopts positions that conflict with an MP’s principles, crossing the floor can be seen not as betrayal but as a fulfillment of that representative duty.
It also serves as a check on party leadership. Modern Westminster systems concentrate significant power in leaders and central organizations, enforced through strict party discipline. Floor crossing remains one of the few meaningful constraints on that power, a last resort for MPs or MPPs when internal dissent fails and caucus concerns are ignored. Historically in Canada, leaders were expected to maintain the confidence of their caucus and persuade rather than command. As power has become more centralized, the ability of members to act independently has diminished, making floor crossing one of the few remaining tools to reassert accountability.
Floor crossing also allows Parliament to respond to changing political realities between elections. Parties evolve, leadership priorities shift, and new issues emerge. Rather than freezing representation until the next vote, it allows the composition of the House to adjust in real time. In some cases, MPs may reasonably conclude that another party is better positioned to represent their constituents’ interests, making the decision less about opportunism and more about maintaining alignment with those who elected them.
In Canada, while floor crossing is not new, it has rarely played such a visible role in altering the effective strength of a government. Individual defections have typically helped minorities survive rather than move toward a working majority. The recent pattern stands out because of its cumulative impact on parliamentary arithmetic. However, that does not change the underlying principles of the Westminster system, in which governments are formed from the confidence of the House as it exists at any given time, not frozen at the results of the last election.
Public reaction, however, is often partisan. Defections that benefit one’s own side are minimized or defended, while those that strengthen opponents are condemned. In Canada, criticism has been louder when crossings bolster a Liberal government, while similar moves that reinforced Stephen Harper’s Conservatives generally produced less sustained outrage in conservative leaning circles. The principle invoked, democratic legitimacy, is often consistent, but the intensity of concern is not.
The claim that voters “did not vote for a Liberal majority” reflects a misunderstanding of the system. Canadians elect individual MPs, not a fixed national government. The balance of the House can legitimately evolve between elections, and when MPs change affiliation, that balance changes with them. That is inherent to Westminster parliamentary democracy.
Other Westminster systems have seen this dynamic even more clearly. In the United Kingdom, for example, defections have directly affected whether governments could maintain a working majority. Across the broader tradition, such shifts have at times determined whether governments survive or fall.
Ultimately, the case for floor crossing rests on a choice about the nature of representation. If MPs are independent representatives, accountable to their constituents and their own judgment, then floor crossing is a legitimate, if rare, expression of that role. In that sense, it is not a flaw in the system, but one of the mechanisms that keeps it responsive and accountable.
> If a party shifts its platform, breaks commitments, or adopts positions that conflict with an MP’s principles, crossing the floor can be seen not as betrayal but as a fulfillment of that representative duty.
Or the party leader turns out to be ... "less than expected".
> it has rarely played such a visible role in altering the effective strength of a government
I'd say it hasn't played much of a role in altering the **effective** strength of *this* government either. A theoretical possibility of bringing down the government that isn't going to actually happen doesn't really change the effective strength, only the theoretical strength. I could be wrong, but I don't think Mr. Carney's government was falling until he decided to pull the plug. Whether I like it or not, things were and are very much in his favour.
The idea that 'we didn't vote for a Liberal majority' is ludicrous. Its a win or lose proposition. If you want the Liberals to lead parliament you vote for the Liberal candidate, if you want the Conservatives to lead, same thing. I can't get my head around the magical thinking that someone would go to a polling station and vote to lose - who would they vote for to achieve that result? If they wanted that, why didn't they vote NDP to split the vote on the left? Its such weird reasoning, and maybe sour grapes???
So, radical idea. If you live in a riding where an MP crossed the floor, you voted for said MP, and you now feel that you're no longer being well served by said MP after their floor crossing, I'm happy to consider your grievances (though at the end of the day, your recourse comes from from the ballot box the next time around). Everyone else-- we got exactly what we voted for (whether or not we like it).
I have no issues with the legal reasoning in this article. It is highly unlikely that the Courts will interfere in the ability of MP's to cross the floor.
Which brings us no closer to a solution as to how to deal with a situation that is clearly being abused to subvert democracy. Mass floor crossing, actively sought by sitting government with its infinite and highly asymmetric resources compared to opposition, induced with promises of various types of gain, and used to shift the power level of government in a real and substantive way. Nobody thought this was a thing we would have to contend with.
Even if you disagree that it is currently a subversion of democracy, it's clear that we've broken the seal and a future government is certain to use floor crossing in an even more extreme way. At what point do each of us go "oh yah that's straight up corruption being used to seize power"? 10 MP's? 20? 50? What promises are acceptable inducements? Money for riding? Cabinet post? Jobs after politics? A thousand $100 Visa gift cards? Because it seems pretty squishy about what is actually allowed here.
We can be glib about how this is nothing more than "politics as usual" and "how our system works" but clearly this is something new. And no I don't care what the polls say and that doesn't justify anything. You don't get to "correct" your government to match a polling bump. Would it ever work the other way? Not likely.
We need to expect better, not just reassure ourselves with smug justifications that this situation is somehow normal or made acceptable by one's partisan biases, as the case may be.
I think you’re right to be concerned about concentration of power and the potential for abuse, that’s a real issue in modern Canadian politics. But I don’t think floor crossing itself is the root of that problem, or that eliminating it would solve it.
What youare describing; mass inducement, patronage, pressure from a government with far greater resources, isn’t really about floor crossing. It’s about executive power and party discipline, both of which already exist and operate in many other ways. Removing floor crossing doesn’t reduce that power, it actually strengthens it by eliminating one of the few ways an MP can break with their party once elected.
There’s also an important distinction between something feeling new and it being structurally new. Governments have always used incentives, appointments, and political pressure to build support. That doesn’t make every instance acceptable, but it does mean the underlying dynamic isn’t unprecedented. John A. Macdonald, Robert Borden and Jean Chrétien attracted a swath of MPs to their respective governments — though all in vastly different circumstances.
Where I would agree with you is this, if there are concerns about inducements crossing into corruption, that’s a matter for clear rules around ethics, appointments, and transparency. That’s where the line should be drawn, not at the act of an MP changing affiliation itself. Otherwise, you risk treating the symptom while leaving the underlying imbalance untouched.
On the question of “how many is too many,” I’d actually flip that around. If enough MPs choose to leave their party, whether for principle, pressure, or political calculation, that tells us something about the state of that party or the system. I think the Marilyn Gladu crossing speaks loudly in this regard. In a Westminster parliament, the government’s legitimacy comes from the confidence of the House as it exists, not as it was frozen on election night.
Requiring a by-election might feel like a clean solution, but in practice it would firther entrench party control. It would make MPs even more dependent on party machinery to survive politically, which is exactly the concentration of power you’re worried about.
So I don’t think the answer is to close off floor crossing. The better question is how to deal with executive overreach, strengthen caucus independence, and ensure transparency around political inducements. Those are the real pressure points in the system.
Those are nice ideals but we aren't ever going to do any of that. Each government is less transparent than the last.
I doubt any party would introduce legislation to require by elections for floor crossing either. We are each pissing in the wind while our democracy crumbles.
But it's clear this particular incarnation of democratic decline says more about a prime minister willing to enthusiastically shred norms regarding inducements than it does about an opposition leader who can't compete with government favours. We all have our price.
And the effect is waved away because it's 'legal', as if those who point out just how subversive is this practice in today's governments are somehow confused or ignorant because it's legal for 'reasons'. The brute fact is that this practice in effect removes the 'representative' justification for elected members. And that tells every voter in the country that theirs doesn't matter a tinker's damn compared to the transitory wishes of the elected/empowered. The effect this practice creates is an unjustified government in the eyes of the electorate. That is a cost gladly assumed by those who personally benefit by their betrayal. And it is a betrayal not in legal terms of constitutionality but saying one thing and then doing something else. It doesn't take a constitutional expert to grasp that responsible grownups say what they mean, mean what they say, and do what they say they are going to do. But we cannot possibly hold the same standard to our elected representatives, of course, because, hey, it's legal!
I just can't make equivalence between academic arguments about "oh everyone knows you vote for the individual MP not the party" and the reality where most people are voting for the party platform if not deliberately for the party leader as a kind of chancellor-president, and will no longer be guaranteed what their vote will represent even if the local candidate they vote for wins.
It's also a little rich of those who laud the independence of these MP's when the floor crossers will just become fully whipped votes for a different party.
And what happens with this illegitimately obtained majority when the polls flip, which they well could if Carney predictably fails to change course from Trudeau era spending and financial malfeasance? What does that do to society? Our PM did a dangerous and deeply irresponsible thing here.
I am so sick of this "it's legal" argument!!! The reality is exactly as you say and this is nothing more than a matter of personal integrity for the floor crosser. I am fine with someone wanting out of caucus but resign and stand for re-election. This is NOT complicated. The fact we can't expect this minimal level of baseline integrity from an MP who held himself out in a particular way to get elected is a stinging indictment of the system. It is an absolute betrayal of voters - and voters only as I could give a rat's ass about the aggrieved political party in any given floor crossing.
And has set a bribery precedence (in the sense of the act of influencing the official or political action of another by inducements) that cannot improve but harm the trust Canadians would prefer to have in voting for their selected representatives in government. It's that harm to trust that no amount of legal argument and rationalization can remove. The harm doesn't matter. That's why the effect will be knowingly negative and still pursued and justified by the most unethical among us, that more and more Canadians will simply stop bothering to vote. But hey, as long as Carney gets the majority to reorganize committees and immediately act to bury important concerns and criticisms from the public eye, that's all that really matters here. But it's legal. And so it must be okay. Grin and bear it, folks; that's what elbows up patriotism hard at work looks like from Ottawa's perspective, donchaknow. Now what colour lipstick should I select for my next pig?
That's the crux of it. It doesn't matter whether this is legal. Our government is playing a hugely dangerous game for the long term health of our democracy and are getting a pass on technical grounds.
This should concern everyone and be taken as proof that Mark Carney is morally unfit to be a leader. To default to such a ruthless and slimy option even when none was needed really says a lot. In a surprisingly similar vein to his friend Donald, south of the border. Just quieter and will full cooperation of the media.
Indeed, imagine if Trump induced enough sitting politicians to mysteriously join his side as to avoid impeachment or to avoid losing control of the houses. Just imagine the screaming, and justifiably so.
Canada sits at the highly centralized end of the Westminster democratic spectrum. While all Westminster systems rely on party discipline to some extent, Canada has evolved into one of the most leader dominated versions of the model, with exceptional power concentrated in the Prime Minister’s Office and party leadership.
Compared to the United Kingdom, Canadian MPs generally have less independence from their leaders. British backbench MPs are more willing and able to rebel against party leadership, and prime ministers in Britain have repeatedly been weakened or removed by their own caucus. Canada retains the Westminster structure inherited from Britain, but has developed a much tighter system of message discipline and leader control.
Australia also has strong party discipline, but its caucuses traditionally exercise more authority over leadership. Australian prime ministers can be removed quickly by their own party room, something that occurs far less easily in Canada. This gives Australian MPs more leverage over leadership than their Canadian counterparts typically possess.
New Zealand moved in a different direction after adopting proportional representation, which made coalition governments more common and encouraged negotiation between parties. While party discipline still exists there, the political culture is generally more flexible and consensus driven than Canada’s more centralized model.
Ireland provides another useful comparison. While Irish parties maintain discipline, independent legislators play a much larger role in parliamentary life than they do in Canada. Irish governments have often depended on independents, coalition agreements, and looser parliamentary alignments to maintain confidence. This has produced a more flexible political culture, where parliamentary negotiation and shifting alliances are treated as a normal part of democratic politics rather than a constitutional crisis.
Other democracies illustrate the tradeoffs even more clearly. India imposed strict anti defection laws to stop rampant floor crossing, but the result was a major reduction in MP independence and a significant increase in party leadership control. By contrast, countries with more fluid parliamentary cultures tend to preserve a stronger role for individual legislators, even if that sometimes creates instability or unpredictability.
Taken together, these comparisons show that Canada already gives party leadership unusually strong control over MPs through caucus discipline, nomination power, and centralized communications. In that context, mechanisms like floor crossing can be seen not as a breakdown of parliamentary democracy, but as one of the few remaining expressions of MP independence within an increasingly centralized political system.
A simple chart for comparison.... Sorry typed this damn chart out but there is no way to format it to make any sense.
Rank........Country.......... Level of MP Independence.......... Key Characteristics
1 ..........Ireland................. Very High ...........................................Strong role for independents, flexible parliamentary alignments, coalition bargaining common, more political parties electable.
2 ..........United Kingdom....... High .......................................Backbench rebellions more common, caucus
can seriously challenge leadership
3 ...........New Zealand........... Moderately High ..................Coalition politics encourages negotiation and flexibility between parties
4 ..........Australia.................. Moderate ................................Strong discipline, but caucus retains real power over leadership
6........... India.................. Very Low.......................................... Anti defection laws heavily restrict dissent and strengthen party leadership control
None of this is to suggest that Canada’s democratic system is beyond criticism, or that it should remain frozen as it is. I strongly believe Canada can become a more transparent, accountable, and equitable democracy. But meaningful reform begins with a better public understanding of how our parliamentary system actually functions, both its strengths and its weaknesses. Too often, debates around democracy are driven by party politics and anger at particular outcomes rather than by an understanding of the constitutional principles involved. An informed and engaged population is ultimately the best safeguard against excessive centralization of power, regardless of which party happens to hold office. Democracy is strengthened not by weakening independent representation, but by demanding greater transparency, accountability, and civic understanding from both governments and citizens alike.
All that being said, political Parties have become very powerful and have stifled the independence of individual MP’s. If you’re not loyal to the party you won’t get the nomination to run under the Party banner. The constitutional “independence “ argument has been weakened drastically to the point of non existence. If you can’t be loyal to the constituents who, in good faith, elected you , then resign and run in a by election as an independent. Academic arguments to the contrary do not reflect what voters know about the system and it’s reality.
I actually agree with much of your diagnosis, party control over MPs has become far too strong in Canada. But I think that leads to the opposite conclusion from the one you’re drawing.
You’re right that nomination control and party discipline have weakened MP independence. That is precisely why preserving the ability to cross the floor still matters. If MPs are already constrained by caucus discipline, leadership control, and the threat of losing their nomination, then requiring a by election every time they break with their party would reduce them even further into agents of party leadership.
You say MPs should be “loyal to the constituents who elected them,” but many MPs would argue that crossing the floor is sometimes exactly that, especially if they believe their party no longer reflects the interests or values of their riding, or if leadership has taken the party in a direction they cannot support. In a Westminster system, the seat belongs to the MP because they are expected to exercise judgment, not simply occupy a party owned position.
I also disagree that this is merely an “academic” argument detached from reality. The reality is that our system was intentionally designed this way because parliamentary democracy depends on MPs retaining at least some independence from centralized party control. The fact that modern politics has weakened that independence does not mean we should eliminate what little remains of it.
If anything, the increasing dominance of party leadership is the strongest argument against making floor crossing even more difficult.
You make some very good points. However, if an MP believes the leadership of the party has drifted into an intolerable position, then consult with constituents and tell them your thoughts and inform them of your decision to cross the floor. Not sure motives are that altruistic. Maybe some cross for more personal and career gains.
I agree that MPs should explain themselves to their constituents when making a decision as significant as crossing the floor. In fact, most who do cross publicly justify it in exactly those terms, disagreement with leadership, concern over the direction of the party, or a belief that they can better represent the interests of their riding elsewhere. Whether voters ultimately accept that explanation is another matter, and in our system, they retain the ability to pass judgment at the next election.
What is often overlooked is that floor crossing is usually far more politically risky than rewarding. Based on what was recently reported on davemanuel.com there have been roughly 132 MPs who crossed the floor since Confederation and of those, only 42 were re-elected with their new party. It was unclear as to how many ran and lost, as opposed to those who retired and decided not to run again. If this were simply an easy path to personal advancement, we would likely see it happen far more often but with a 30% re-election average, I think that keeps the floor crossing reasonably low. Federally, only a few have been truly successful, Belinda Stronach (C to L), David Emerson (L to C) and Scott Brison (PC to L) all crossed and were eventually rewarded Cabinet positions, although only Brison stayed on a long time making a real career in Parliament. https://www.davemanuel.com/canadian-floor-crossers-complete-history-party-switchers.php
The reality is that crossing the floor can end a political career, which suggests that for many MPs the decision is driven at least as much by political conviction or conflict with leadership as by personal ambition.
You're getting letters from whining Conservatives who hate that it happened to them. I think the notion that we vote for the person is a long-dead idea....the government is run out of the PMO; Chretien being when that reality became obvious. I vote party and leader, and have for decades. I still think crossing the floor is a betrayal of voters who think as I do, and should require a by-election. To be clear, I accept that floor crossing will happen. I believe it should be followed by a by-election so the riding gets the final say on who represents them. That won't happen because both sides are fearful of closing a loophole they might benefit from.....the same reason that FPP is here to stay, dubiously democratic as it is.
I've asked this question before, but how would you require it?
"Oh don't worry man.. I haven't crossed the floor... I just vote with the government because they make a really good case every time. And yeah, sure, I get invited to their caucus meetings... but that's because I want to represent a good conservative case in the LPC meetings! ... And yes, I'm in a minister in cabinet, but that's because that's because this is now a coalition government with CPC and LPC leadership... you know what? I am offended that you would even suggest I've crossed the floor when you should be thanking me for making this government a conservative one!"
So how would you prevent floor crossings? I mean, in real practical terms... how would you stop it from happening?
There are ways... and they all come with implications that people will like much, much less than floor crossing.
You have actually highlighted the core problem, but also why banning or restricting floor crossing isn’t a workable solution.
In practical terms, it is not possible to prevent an MP from aligning with another party. An MP can vote with the government against their own party, coordinate with it, attend meetings, or work closely with its members without ever formally crossing the floor or joining its caucus. Any attempt to prohibit this is either meaningless, because it can be easily worked around, or it requires policing how MPs vote and who they associate with. At that point, you are no longer protecting democracy, you are restricting it by reducing MPs to agents of their party rather than independent representatives.
More importantly, MPs are already heavily constrained by party discipline. If a member breaks ranks, they can be removed from caucus during a parliamentary session, losing influence, resources, and standing, or denied the party nomination in the next election. Those are real and immediate consequences. So it’s not as though MPs can act freely without risk, the system already strongly enforces loyalty.
That’s why floor crossing matters. It’s one of the last remaining avenues for an MP to act independently when internal dissent fails. If you remove it, while keeping strong leadership control over caucus and nominations, you’re not solving the problem of centralized power, you’re reinforcing it.
If there are concerns about inducements or abuse, that’s where the focus should be, on ethics rules, transparency, and limits on patronage. But targeting floor crossing itself risks eliminating the one mechanism that still allows MPs to break from party control in a meaningful and visible way.
So the choice isn’t really between floor crossing and no floor crossing. It’s between allowing it openly, or driving the same behaviour into less transparent forms while further weakening MP independence.
Excellent. There will be no more floor crossings. And no by-elections.
Those four Conservatives will still be Conservatives and the New Democrat will still be a New Democrat.... of course they will also be voting with the LPC, advocating for LPC legislation, chatting collegially with members of the LPC, attending LPC caucus meetings (as a guest of course), chatting with the LPC party whip and so on. Oh and they might also make public speeches about how much Pierre Poilievre and or Avi Lewis suck, have the leadership skills and physical attractiveness of a donkey and are the most unpleasant human beings on the face of the earth. BUT... they did not and will not "cross the floor".
All good then?
Hyperbole about donkey-face aside, do you see the practical problem you haven't solved yet?
If these rules were in place a year ago, no one would have (officially) crossed the floor.
And we’d have four conservative MPs and one NDP MP who would go to LPC, caucus meetings and LPC conventions and LPC barbeques, repeat LPC, talking points, advocate for LPC legislation and vote with the LPC.
In other words, they WOULD HAVE crossed the floor in all but name.
My question to you is this. Would you call that a successful prevention of floor crossing?
Because I call it continuing to have floor crossing without by-elections except with extra steps.
We'll agree to disagree that that is even a possibility. Lori Idlout crossed the floor to get support for her riding. Probably a wise move considering the state of the GOP. I believe Pierre is the reason for the Conservative defections.
Saying “we vote for the party” reflects how politics feels today, not how the system is designed to function. In a Westminster system, the seat belongs to the MP, not the party. If anything, the concentration of power in the PMO, something you point out that became more visible under Jean Chrétien and has continued since, makes it more important that MPs retain some independence. Floor crossing isn’t ideal, but removing it would further entrench party control and leave MPs with even fewer ways to hold their own leadership accountable. You see the problem which WE BOTH AGREE ON, but your solution of requiring a by-election is not the solution. Floor crossing is basically that last tendril of MP independence. Remove it, and you don’t fix the problem of centralized power, you reinforce it by making MPs even more dependent on party leadership for their political survival.
I think the design and the reality have parted ways. The larger the majority, the more power the head office has, as it will just chuck dissenters from caucus. We've seen it with Doug during COVID and Justin with JWR. Again, I'm not against the concept of floor crossing. I just think the voters deserves the final say in a by-election.
If it case of fraudulent representation, or a case to return donated money to the party it was intended for I disagree. The voters who worked on the campaigns and the donors who donated to a specific party deserve recourse from these members. Un less the candidate can demonstrate that he or she would have won regardless of party affiliation a fraud was perpetrated. Donating to a political campaign is not the same as investing where there is risk of loss. You donate and work on campaigns because you believe in the values of that party and that candidate representing that party.
Or, you believe in that candidate and their values, who have been elected to exercise their judgment, not simply act as a fixed extension of a party label. In a Westminster system, the seat belongs to the member, not the party, and their responsibility is ultimately to their constituents and their conscience, even when that leads them to leave the party under which they were elected.
Very few members fulfill their responsibility to represent their constituents once elected. Most simply become lackeys to the PMO, vote as directed and parrot the sound bites provided by the back room.
Crossing the floor is one of the only powers an individual MP has left. People are chapped because they are crossing the floor to minority government and helping it become a majority, fair enough, but consider the alternative scenario.... stopping floor crossing from happening when a majority government is losing MPs.
I think our constitution was unfortunately drafted poorly, and is very quickly leading to way too much centralization of power. It's set up so poorly that floor-crossing could literally be the only thing that can stop the worse from happening when the rubber really meets the road. Sadly, I think our politicians would fail to act on principle rather than self-interest, but stranger things have happened.
A timely and insightful column that encapsulates the frustration of many Canadians who feel removed from the democratic process through the actions of floor crossers. While this action is not prohibited by the constitution, it is fair to call it a moral and ethical failure by the voters' elected representatives. Especially in a system where the representative, once elected, becomes totally beholden to the Party and not to the voters. The Westminster system where, “Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgement” is no longer fit for purpose where the members, once elected become, in the words of Trudeau senior, "nobodies". The voters in effect are voting for a party and crossing the floor reverses that decision and steals that vote and violates the intent of the voter.
Political parties aren't part of or even named in the Canadian Constitution, and I'd prefer to keep it that way. We already grant political partisans far too much influence over major decisions in this country. As this column suggests, Canadians need to put more effort into figuring out *who* they want representing them, not just picking the candidate with a particular party behind their name. It's also great to have that opportunity: it allows voters to reject loathsome partisan figures who are popular within a party. In many proportional representation systems, those people keep getting elected because they're picked from a party list.
Music to my ears, my friend!
Indeed. And among other things, one does wonder how the solution to 'political parties are bad creatures that turn MPs into mouthpieces of the PMO' would be 'so we should make them even more important to the process, in fact more important than the individual MP in any way.'
What an excellent, well-researched and well-reasoned argument. Thank you.
Floor crossing in a Westminster style parliament can be defended on the basis that elected representatives are meant to exercise independent judgment, not simply act as agents of their party. As Ms. Van Geyn points out, this idea is rooted in the thinking of Edmund Burke, who argued that a representative owes constituents their reasoned judgment rather than blind obedience. If a party shifts its platform, breaks commitments, or adopts positions that conflict with an MP’s principles, crossing the floor can be seen not as betrayal but as a fulfillment of that representative duty.
It also serves as a check on party leadership. Modern Westminster systems concentrate significant power in leaders and central organizations, enforced through strict party discipline. Floor crossing remains one of the few meaningful constraints on that power, a last resort for MPs or MPPs when internal dissent fails and caucus concerns are ignored. Historically in Canada, leaders were expected to maintain the confidence of their caucus and persuade rather than command. As power has become more centralized, the ability of members to act independently has diminished, making floor crossing one of the few remaining tools to reassert accountability.
Floor crossing also allows Parliament to respond to changing political realities between elections. Parties evolve, leadership priorities shift, and new issues emerge. Rather than freezing representation until the next vote, it allows the composition of the House to adjust in real time. In some cases, MPs may reasonably conclude that another party is better positioned to represent their constituents’ interests, making the decision less about opportunism and more about maintaining alignment with those who elected them.
In Canada, while floor crossing is not new, it has rarely played such a visible role in altering the effective strength of a government. Individual defections have typically helped minorities survive rather than move toward a working majority. The recent pattern stands out because of its cumulative impact on parliamentary arithmetic. However, that does not change the underlying principles of the Westminster system, in which governments are formed from the confidence of the House as it exists at any given time, not frozen at the results of the last election.
Public reaction, however, is often partisan. Defections that benefit one’s own side are minimized or defended, while those that strengthen opponents are condemned. In Canada, criticism has been louder when crossings bolster a Liberal government, while similar moves that reinforced Stephen Harper’s Conservatives generally produced less sustained outrage in conservative leaning circles. The principle invoked, democratic legitimacy, is often consistent, but the intensity of concern is not.
The claim that voters “did not vote for a Liberal majority” reflects a misunderstanding of the system. Canadians elect individual MPs, not a fixed national government. The balance of the House can legitimately evolve between elections, and when MPs change affiliation, that balance changes with them. That is inherent to Westminster parliamentary democracy.
Other Westminster systems have seen this dynamic even more clearly. In the United Kingdom, for example, defections have directly affected whether governments could maintain a working majority. Across the broader tradition, such shifts have at times determined whether governments survive or fall.
Ultimately, the case for floor crossing rests on a choice about the nature of representation. If MPs are independent representatives, accountable to their constituents and their own judgment, then floor crossing is a legitimate, if rare, expression of that role. In that sense, it is not a flaw in the system, but one of the mechanisms that keeps it responsive and accountable.
Very well and comprehensively stated.
> If a party shifts its platform, breaks commitments, or adopts positions that conflict with an MP’s principles, crossing the floor can be seen not as betrayal but as a fulfillment of that representative duty.
Or the party leader turns out to be ... "less than expected".
> it has rarely played such a visible role in altering the effective strength of a government
I'd say it hasn't played much of a role in altering the **effective** strength of *this* government either. A theoretical possibility of bringing down the government that isn't going to actually happen doesn't really change the effective strength, only the theoretical strength. I could be wrong, but I don't think Mr. Carney's government was falling until he decided to pull the plug. Whether I like it or not, things were and are very much in his favour.
The idea that 'we didn't vote for a Liberal majority' is ludicrous. Its a win or lose proposition. If you want the Liberals to lead parliament you vote for the Liberal candidate, if you want the Conservatives to lead, same thing. I can't get my head around the magical thinking that someone would go to a polling station and vote to lose - who would they vote for to achieve that result? If they wanted that, why didn't they vote NDP to split the vote on the left? Its such weird reasoning, and maybe sour grapes???
For me, I'm hearing mostly the bonkers price of gas from folks. What are you hearing?
So, radical idea. If you live in a riding where an MP crossed the floor, you voted for said MP, and you now feel that you're no longer being well served by said MP after their floor crossing, I'm happy to consider your grievances (though at the end of the day, your recourse comes from from the ballot box the next time around). Everyone else-- we got exactly what we voted for (whether or not we like it).
I have no issues with the legal reasoning in this article. It is highly unlikely that the Courts will interfere in the ability of MP's to cross the floor.
Which brings us no closer to a solution as to how to deal with a situation that is clearly being abused to subvert democracy. Mass floor crossing, actively sought by sitting government with its infinite and highly asymmetric resources compared to opposition, induced with promises of various types of gain, and used to shift the power level of government in a real and substantive way. Nobody thought this was a thing we would have to contend with.
Even if you disagree that it is currently a subversion of democracy, it's clear that we've broken the seal and a future government is certain to use floor crossing in an even more extreme way. At what point do each of us go "oh yah that's straight up corruption being used to seize power"? 10 MP's? 20? 50? What promises are acceptable inducements? Money for riding? Cabinet post? Jobs after politics? A thousand $100 Visa gift cards? Because it seems pretty squishy about what is actually allowed here.
We can be glib about how this is nothing more than "politics as usual" and "how our system works" but clearly this is something new. And no I don't care what the polls say and that doesn't justify anything. You don't get to "correct" your government to match a polling bump. Would it ever work the other way? Not likely.
We need to expect better, not just reassure ourselves with smug justifications that this situation is somehow normal or made acceptable by one's partisan biases, as the case may be.
I think you’re right to be concerned about concentration of power and the potential for abuse, that’s a real issue in modern Canadian politics. But I don’t think floor crossing itself is the root of that problem, or that eliminating it would solve it.
What youare describing; mass inducement, patronage, pressure from a government with far greater resources, isn’t really about floor crossing. It’s about executive power and party discipline, both of which already exist and operate in many other ways. Removing floor crossing doesn’t reduce that power, it actually strengthens it by eliminating one of the few ways an MP can break with their party once elected.
There’s also an important distinction between something feeling new and it being structurally new. Governments have always used incentives, appointments, and political pressure to build support. That doesn’t make every instance acceptable, but it does mean the underlying dynamic isn’t unprecedented. John A. Macdonald, Robert Borden and Jean Chrétien attracted a swath of MPs to their respective governments — though all in vastly different circumstances.
Where I would agree with you is this, if there are concerns about inducements crossing into corruption, that’s a matter for clear rules around ethics, appointments, and transparency. That’s where the line should be drawn, not at the act of an MP changing affiliation itself. Otherwise, you risk treating the symptom while leaving the underlying imbalance untouched.
On the question of “how many is too many,” I’d actually flip that around. If enough MPs choose to leave their party, whether for principle, pressure, or political calculation, that tells us something about the state of that party or the system. I think the Marilyn Gladu crossing speaks loudly in this regard. In a Westminster parliament, the government’s legitimacy comes from the confidence of the House as it exists, not as it was frozen on election night.
Requiring a by-election might feel like a clean solution, but in practice it would firther entrench party control. It would make MPs even more dependent on party machinery to survive politically, which is exactly the concentration of power you’re worried about.
So I don’t think the answer is to close off floor crossing. The better question is how to deal with executive overreach, strengthen caucus independence, and ensure transparency around political inducements. Those are the real pressure points in the system.
Those are nice ideals but we aren't ever going to do any of that. Each government is less transparent than the last.
I doubt any party would introduce legislation to require by elections for floor crossing either. We are each pissing in the wind while our democracy crumbles.
But it's clear this particular incarnation of democratic decline says more about a prime minister willing to enthusiastically shred norms regarding inducements than it does about an opposition leader who can't compete with government favours. We all have our price.
And the effect is waved away because it's 'legal', as if those who point out just how subversive is this practice in today's governments are somehow confused or ignorant because it's legal for 'reasons'. The brute fact is that this practice in effect removes the 'representative' justification for elected members. And that tells every voter in the country that theirs doesn't matter a tinker's damn compared to the transitory wishes of the elected/empowered. The effect this practice creates is an unjustified government in the eyes of the electorate. That is a cost gladly assumed by those who personally benefit by their betrayal. And it is a betrayal not in legal terms of constitutionality but saying one thing and then doing something else. It doesn't take a constitutional expert to grasp that responsible grownups say what they mean, mean what they say, and do what they say they are going to do. But we cannot possibly hold the same standard to our elected representatives, of course, because, hey, it's legal!
I just can't make equivalence between academic arguments about "oh everyone knows you vote for the individual MP not the party" and the reality where most people are voting for the party platform if not deliberately for the party leader as a kind of chancellor-president, and will no longer be guaranteed what their vote will represent even if the local candidate they vote for wins.
It's also a little rich of those who laud the independence of these MP's when the floor crossers will just become fully whipped votes for a different party.
And what happens with this illegitimately obtained majority when the polls flip, which they well could if Carney predictably fails to change course from Trudeau era spending and financial malfeasance? What does that do to society? Our PM did a dangerous and deeply irresponsible thing here.
I am so sick of this "it's legal" argument!!! The reality is exactly as you say and this is nothing more than a matter of personal integrity for the floor crosser. I am fine with someone wanting out of caucus but resign and stand for re-election. This is NOT complicated. The fact we can't expect this minimal level of baseline integrity from an MP who held himself out in a particular way to get elected is a stinging indictment of the system. It is an absolute betrayal of voters - and voters only as I could give a rat's ass about the aggrieved political party in any given floor crossing.
And has set a bribery precedence (in the sense of the act of influencing the official or political action of another by inducements) that cannot improve but harm the trust Canadians would prefer to have in voting for their selected representatives in government. It's that harm to trust that no amount of legal argument and rationalization can remove. The harm doesn't matter. That's why the effect will be knowingly negative and still pursued and justified by the most unethical among us, that more and more Canadians will simply stop bothering to vote. But hey, as long as Carney gets the majority to reorganize committees and immediately act to bury important concerns and criticisms from the public eye, that's all that really matters here. But it's legal. And so it must be okay. Grin and bear it, folks; that's what elbows up patriotism hard at work looks like from Ottawa's perspective, donchaknow. Now what colour lipstick should I select for my next pig?
That's the crux of it. It doesn't matter whether this is legal. Our government is playing a hugely dangerous game for the long term health of our democracy and are getting a pass on technical grounds.
This should concern everyone and be taken as proof that Mark Carney is morally unfit to be a leader. To default to such a ruthless and slimy option even when none was needed really says a lot. In a surprisingly similar vein to his friend Donald, south of the border. Just quieter and will full cooperation of the media.
Indeed, imagine if Trump induced enough sitting politicians to mysteriously join his side as to avoid impeachment or to avoid losing control of the houses. Just imagine the screaming, and justifiably so.
Canada sits at the highly centralized end of the Westminster democratic spectrum. While all Westminster systems rely on party discipline to some extent, Canada has evolved into one of the most leader dominated versions of the model, with exceptional power concentrated in the Prime Minister’s Office and party leadership.
Compared to the United Kingdom, Canadian MPs generally have less independence from their leaders. British backbench MPs are more willing and able to rebel against party leadership, and prime ministers in Britain have repeatedly been weakened or removed by their own caucus. Canada retains the Westminster structure inherited from Britain, but has developed a much tighter system of message discipline and leader control.
Australia also has strong party discipline, but its caucuses traditionally exercise more authority over leadership. Australian prime ministers can be removed quickly by their own party room, something that occurs far less easily in Canada. This gives Australian MPs more leverage over leadership than their Canadian counterparts typically possess.
New Zealand moved in a different direction after adopting proportional representation, which made coalition governments more common and encouraged negotiation between parties. While party discipline still exists there, the political culture is generally more flexible and consensus driven than Canada’s more centralized model.
Ireland provides another useful comparison. While Irish parties maintain discipline, independent legislators play a much larger role in parliamentary life than they do in Canada. Irish governments have often depended on independents, coalition agreements, and looser parliamentary alignments to maintain confidence. This has produced a more flexible political culture, where parliamentary negotiation and shifting alliances are treated as a normal part of democratic politics rather than a constitutional crisis.
Other democracies illustrate the tradeoffs even more clearly. India imposed strict anti defection laws to stop rampant floor crossing, but the result was a major reduction in MP independence and a significant increase in party leadership control. By contrast, countries with more fluid parliamentary cultures tend to preserve a stronger role for individual legislators, even if that sometimes creates instability or unpredictability.
Taken together, these comparisons show that Canada already gives party leadership unusually strong control over MPs through caucus discipline, nomination power, and centralized communications. In that context, mechanisms like floor crossing can be seen not as a breakdown of parliamentary democracy, but as one of the few remaining expressions of MP independence within an increasingly centralized political system.
A simple chart for comparison.... Sorry typed this damn chart out but there is no way to format it to make any sense.
Rank........Country.......... Level of MP Independence.......... Key Characteristics
1 ..........Ireland................. Very High ...........................................Strong role for independents, flexible parliamentary alignments, coalition bargaining common, more political parties electable.
2 ..........United Kingdom....... High .......................................Backbench rebellions more common, caucus
can seriously challenge leadership
3 ...........New Zealand........... Moderately High ..................Coalition politics encourages negotiation and flexibility between parties
4 ..........Australia.................. Moderate ................................Strong discipline, but caucus retains real power over leadership
5........ Canada.................... Low ...............................................Strong PMO control, rigid message discipline,
leadership dominance over caucus and nominations
6........... India.................. Very Low.......................................... Anti defection laws heavily restrict dissent and strengthen party leadership control
None of this is to suggest that Canada’s democratic system is beyond criticism, or that it should remain frozen as it is. I strongly believe Canada can become a more transparent, accountable, and equitable democracy. But meaningful reform begins with a better public understanding of how our parliamentary system actually functions, both its strengths and its weaknesses. Too often, debates around democracy are driven by party politics and anger at particular outcomes rather than by an understanding of the constitutional principles involved. An informed and engaged population is ultimately the best safeguard against excessive centralization of power, regardless of which party happens to hold office. Democracy is strengthened not by weakening independent representation, but by demanding greater transparency, accountability, and civic understanding from both governments and citizens alike.
All that being said, political Parties have become very powerful and have stifled the independence of individual MP’s. If you’re not loyal to the party you won’t get the nomination to run under the Party banner. The constitutional “independence “ argument has been weakened drastically to the point of non existence. If you can’t be loyal to the constituents who, in good faith, elected you , then resign and run in a by election as an independent. Academic arguments to the contrary do not reflect what voters know about the system and it’s reality.
I actually agree with much of your diagnosis, party control over MPs has become far too strong in Canada. But I think that leads to the opposite conclusion from the one you’re drawing.
You’re right that nomination control and party discipline have weakened MP independence. That is precisely why preserving the ability to cross the floor still matters. If MPs are already constrained by caucus discipline, leadership control, and the threat of losing their nomination, then requiring a by election every time they break with their party would reduce them even further into agents of party leadership.
You say MPs should be “loyal to the constituents who elected them,” but many MPs would argue that crossing the floor is sometimes exactly that, especially if they believe their party no longer reflects the interests or values of their riding, or if leadership has taken the party in a direction they cannot support. In a Westminster system, the seat belongs to the MP because they are expected to exercise judgment, not simply occupy a party owned position.
I also disagree that this is merely an “academic” argument detached from reality. The reality is that our system was intentionally designed this way because parliamentary democracy depends on MPs retaining at least some independence from centralized party control. The fact that modern politics has weakened that independence does not mean we should eliminate what little remains of it.
If anything, the increasing dominance of party leadership is the strongest argument against making floor crossing even more difficult.
You make some very good points. However, if an MP believes the leadership of the party has drifted into an intolerable position, then consult with constituents and tell them your thoughts and inform them of your decision to cross the floor. Not sure motives are that altruistic. Maybe some cross for more personal and career gains.
I agree that MPs should explain themselves to their constituents when making a decision as significant as crossing the floor. In fact, most who do cross publicly justify it in exactly those terms, disagreement with leadership, concern over the direction of the party, or a belief that they can better represent the interests of their riding elsewhere. Whether voters ultimately accept that explanation is another matter, and in our system, they retain the ability to pass judgment at the next election.
What is often overlooked is that floor crossing is usually far more politically risky than rewarding. Based on what was recently reported on davemanuel.com there have been roughly 132 MPs who crossed the floor since Confederation and of those, only 42 were re-elected with their new party. It was unclear as to how many ran and lost, as opposed to those who retired and decided not to run again. If this were simply an easy path to personal advancement, we would likely see it happen far more often but with a 30% re-election average, I think that keeps the floor crossing reasonably low. Federally, only a few have been truly successful, Belinda Stronach (C to L), David Emerson (L to C) and Scott Brison (PC to L) all crossed and were eventually rewarded Cabinet positions, although only Brison stayed on a long time making a real career in Parliament. https://www.davemanuel.com/canadian-floor-crossers-complete-history-party-switchers.php
The reality is that crossing the floor can end a political career, which suggests that for many MPs the decision is driven at least as much by political conviction or conflict with leadership as by personal ambition.
Hope to God that you are right. My faith in politicians has been waning for several years now.
You're getting letters from whining Conservatives who hate that it happened to them. I think the notion that we vote for the person is a long-dead idea....the government is run out of the PMO; Chretien being when that reality became obvious. I vote party and leader, and have for decades. I still think crossing the floor is a betrayal of voters who think as I do, and should require a by-election. To be clear, I accept that floor crossing will happen. I believe it should be followed by a by-election so the riding gets the final say on who represents them. That won't happen because both sides are fearful of closing a loophole they might benefit from.....the same reason that FPP is here to stay, dubiously democratic as it is.
I've asked this question before, but how would you require it?
"Oh don't worry man.. I haven't crossed the floor... I just vote with the government because they make a really good case every time. And yeah, sure, I get invited to their caucus meetings... but that's because I want to represent a good conservative case in the LPC meetings! ... And yes, I'm in a minister in cabinet, but that's because that's because this is now a coalition government with CPC and LPC leadership... you know what? I am offended that you would even suggest I've crossed the floor when you should be thanking me for making this government a conservative one!"
So how would you prevent floor crossings? I mean, in real practical terms... how would you stop it from happening?
There are ways... and they all come with implications that people will like much, much less than floor crossing.
Mr. Gorman,
You have actually highlighted the core problem, but also why banning or restricting floor crossing isn’t a workable solution.
In practical terms, it is not possible to prevent an MP from aligning with another party. An MP can vote with the government against their own party, coordinate with it, attend meetings, or work closely with its members without ever formally crossing the floor or joining its caucus. Any attempt to prohibit this is either meaningless, because it can be easily worked around, or it requires policing how MPs vote and who they associate with. At that point, you are no longer protecting democracy, you are restricting it by reducing MPs to agents of their party rather than independent representatives.
More importantly, MPs are already heavily constrained by party discipline. If a member breaks ranks, they can be removed from caucus during a parliamentary session, losing influence, resources, and standing, or denied the party nomination in the next election. Those are real and immediate consequences. So it’s not as though MPs can act freely without risk, the system already strongly enforces loyalty.
That’s why floor crossing matters. It’s one of the last remaining avenues for an MP to act independently when internal dissent fails. If you remove it, while keeping strong leadership control over caucus and nominations, you’re not solving the problem of centralized power, you’re reinforcing it.
If there are concerns about inducements or abuse, that’s where the focus should be, on ethics rules, transparency, and limits on patronage. But targeting floor crossing itself risks eliminating the one mechanism that still allows MPs to break from party control in a meaningful and visible way.
So the choice isn’t really between floor crossing and no floor crossing. It’s between allowing it openly, or driving the same behaviour into less transparent forms while further weakening MP independence.
You don't stop floor crossings. But when they happen, there is an immediate by-election, so the voters get the final say on who represents them.
Excellent. There will be no more floor crossings. And no by-elections.
Those four Conservatives will still be Conservatives and the New Democrat will still be a New Democrat.... of course they will also be voting with the LPC, advocating for LPC legislation, chatting collegially with members of the LPC, attending LPC caucus meetings (as a guest of course), chatting with the LPC party whip and so on. Oh and they might also make public speeches about how much Pierre Poilievre and or Avi Lewis suck, have the leadership skills and physical attractiveness of a donkey and are the most unpleasant human beings on the face of the earth. BUT... they did not and will not "cross the floor".
All good then?
Hyperbole about donkey-face aside, do you see the practical problem you haven't solved yet?
No idea why that's your take. Sorry that you can't go back in time......and change the rules. De Loreans are hard to come by now.
I think it's pretty clear that the nation thinks Pierre sucks.
That’s my take because that’s what would happen.
If these rules were in place a year ago, no one would have (officially) crossed the floor.
And we’d have four conservative MPs and one NDP MP who would go to LPC, caucus meetings and LPC conventions and LPC barbeques, repeat LPC, talking points, advocate for LPC legislation and vote with the LPC.
In other words, they WOULD HAVE crossed the floor in all but name.
My question to you is this. Would you call that a successful prevention of floor crossing?
Because I call it continuing to have floor crossing without by-elections except with extra steps.
We'll agree to disagree that that is even a possibility. Lori Idlout crossed the floor to get support for her riding. Probably a wise move considering the state of the GOP. I believe Pierre is the reason for the Conservative defections.
Saying “we vote for the party” reflects how politics feels today, not how the system is designed to function. In a Westminster system, the seat belongs to the MP, not the party. If anything, the concentration of power in the PMO, something you point out that became more visible under Jean Chrétien and has continued since, makes it more important that MPs retain some independence. Floor crossing isn’t ideal, but removing it would further entrench party control and leave MPs with even fewer ways to hold their own leadership accountable. You see the problem which WE BOTH AGREE ON, but your solution of requiring a by-election is not the solution. Floor crossing is basically that last tendril of MP independence. Remove it, and you don’t fix the problem of centralized power, you reinforce it by making MPs even more dependent on party leadership for their political survival.
I think the design and the reality have parted ways. The larger the majority, the more power the head office has, as it will just chuck dissenters from caucus. We've seen it with Doug during COVID and Justin with JWR. Again, I'm not against the concept of floor crossing. I just think the voters deserves the final say in a by-election.
If it case of fraudulent representation, or a case to return donated money to the party it was intended for I disagree. The voters who worked on the campaigns and the donors who donated to a specific party deserve recourse from these members. Un less the candidate can demonstrate that he or she would have won regardless of party affiliation a fraud was perpetrated. Donating to a political campaign is not the same as investing where there is risk of loss. You donate and work on campaigns because you believe in the values of that party and that candidate representing that party.
Or, you believe in that candidate and their values, who have been elected to exercise their judgment, not simply act as a fixed extension of a party label. In a Westminster system, the seat belongs to the member, not the party, and their responsibility is ultimately to their constituents and their conscience, even when that leads them to leave the party under which they were elected.
Very few members fulfill their responsibility to represent their constituents once elected. Most simply become lackeys to the PMO, vote as directed and parrot the sound bites provided by the back room.
Crossing the floor is one of the only powers an individual MP has left. People are chapped because they are crossing the floor to minority government and helping it become a majority, fair enough, but consider the alternative scenario.... stopping floor crossing from happening when a majority government is losing MPs.
I think our constitution was unfortunately drafted poorly, and is very quickly leading to way too much centralization of power. It's set up so poorly that floor-crossing could literally be the only thing that can stop the worse from happening when the rubber really meets the road. Sadly, I think our politicians would fail to act on principle rather than self-interest, but stranger things have happened.
A timely and insightful column that encapsulates the frustration of many Canadians who feel removed from the democratic process through the actions of floor crossers. While this action is not prohibited by the constitution, it is fair to call it a moral and ethical failure by the voters' elected representatives. Especially in a system where the representative, once elected, becomes totally beholden to the Party and not to the voters. The Westminster system where, “Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgement” is no longer fit for purpose where the members, once elected become, in the words of Trudeau senior, "nobodies". The voters in effect are voting for a party and crossing the floor reverses that decision and steals that vote and violates the intent of the voter.