Jared Wesley and Patricia Paradis: The many hazards of Alberta's Option B
Separatists are selling a 'yes' result as low-risk, when it would cost Albertans dearly in terms of lost time and opportunity
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By: Jared Wesley
Planning to dismantle the country is not something you can do off the side of your desk. The process would consume cabinet attention, legislative time, public service capacity, millions of taxpayer dollars, and nearly all of the political oxygen in the province for at least another election cycle. On Oct. 19, Albertans will choose whether that’s what they want to focus on in the coming years. Or whether they want to get on with the work of leading Confederation and solving the real problems confronting the province.
On the surface, the ballot question appears to be a referendum on whether to hold another referendum:
Should Alberta remain a province of Canada, or should the Government of Alberta commence the legal process required under the Canadian Constitution to hold a binding provincial referendum on whether or not Alberta should separate from Canada?
Option A keeps Alberta in Canada. Option B carries us further down the path to separation, but doesn’t necessarily lock us into independence. This makes Option B look like a cautious middle step. It’s not a direct “leave” vote as with Brexit, or a “yes” vote as with Quebec. It’s only a vote to have another vote, and that’s why separatists can campaign for it without explaining how independence would actually work. They say Option B is merely “keeping the door open,” “letting Alberta have its say,” or “sending Ottawa a message.”
In short, separatist leaders are selling the 10th referendum question as a low-risk way of strengthening Alberta’s bargaining position with Ottawa. Complacent federalists should not accept that premise, nor take the outcome for granted. The stakes are much too high.
The day after an Option B victory, separatists would treat the outcome as a mandate for a second referendum. Some leaders suggest the second vote would happen within weeks or months. That timeline is unrealistic. Indigenous leaders, ministers, officials, lawyers, political parties, and civil society organizations would spend years fighting over consultation, timing, wording, the threshold for victory, and the terms for a hypothetical separation.
In the meantime, an Option B vote would stall all progress toward building new pipelines, killing important momentum toward finding private sector proponents. It would tear up the MOU between Alberta and Canada to expand the TMX pipeline, remove our leverage in CUSMA negotiations, forestall external investment and pause internal growth plans, and put the brakes on economic development in the province more broadly. These opportunity costs arrive at precisely the wrong moment. Alberta is building its influence in Confederation. Option B stalls that progress and replaces practical federalism with another cycle of grievance, litigation, and brinksmanship.
Even with all of the government’s attention, the march to a second referendum would take years. Several obstacles would need to be removed, starting with those concerning treaties with First Nations.
In Athabasca Chipewan First Nation v. Alberta, the Court of King’s Bench quashed the Stay Free Alberta petition after finding that the process triggered the Crown’s duty to consult (and no such consultation had occurred). Alberta has appealed, but the government did not wait for the case to play out before calling this fall’s referendum. Unless the ruling is overturned, the Government of Alberta appears obligated to consult with First Nations before taking any further steps toward a second referendum.
This process would take months if not years, as it would need to address the potential effects of secession on treaty rights, lands, and the continuing relationship between Indigenous peoples and the Crown. Many First Nations have made clear that they do not consent to being carried into an independent Alberta. Some could insist that treaty territories remain within Canada or that their peoples possess a distinct right to decide their future.
Those claims could affect the referendum’s wording and legitimacy, the boundaries of an independent Alberta state, and every negotiation that followed.
The next fight would be over the referendum question itself. Under the federal Clarity Act, the House of Commons must decide whether the wording is acceptable within 30 days of its official release. A question that asks only for permission to negotiate, or bundles independence with promises of economic association, would likely fail the clarity test. Ottawa could not prevent Alberta from holding such a vote, but it could refuse to negotiate afterward.
Only once First Nations consultations are complete and the question is set can the actual referendum campaign take place. At that point, the “remain” and “leave” sides would engage Albertans on the practical meaning of separation. Voters would seek firm, credible answers to questions that separatists, to this point, have dodged: currency, public debt, pensions, citizenship, immigration, tariffs, customs, pipeline access, entitlement programs, border services, criminal law, defense, human rights, and so on. Albertans would be right to demand clear answers on the structure of the ensuing independent government (e.g., republic versus parliamentary democracy), which Canadian laws and institutions would be replicated (e.g., the Crown and Charter rights), and the total cost of the transition.
Most of those answers could not be guaranteed in advance of a second referendum because they depend on negotiations with the rest of Canada. A separatist campaign could promise continued access to public services, frictionless access to Canadian markets, or a favourable share of federal assets. But those are only items on a list of demands; they would have to be negotiated with all nine provinces and the federal government, all of whom would demand steep concessions from Alberta in return.
The central question of the second referendum campaign would revolve, not around whether independence is feasible or desirable, but how much uncertainty voters are prepared to accept about the eventual deal and how much they trust separatist leaders to secure it in a high-stakes, one-versus-ten multilateral negotiation.
Before that vote occurs, the 2027 provincial election would be consumed by the separation issue. Every party and candidate would have to declare whether the referendum will proceed and under what terms. Internal UCP divisions now papered over by “letting Albertans decide” would become impossible to avoid. Forces would likely split the party into federalist and separatist wings, either ahead of or during the campaign itself. Other parties, united on the issue, would have the upper hand. Instead of debating how to fix health care and schools, or attract investment, Albertans would spend the election dithering over hypothetical borders, currencies, and constitutions.
Even a “leave” victory in the second referendum would not bring finality. The Clarity Act does not guarantee that a simple, 50% + 1 outcome would be accepted as a clear majority. The federal government must weigh in on the matter, judging not just the proportion of ballots cast, but also considerations like turnout and distributions of support among different communities. If it finds both the question and the majority clear, Canada would acquire a constitutional obligation to negotiate. But this is by no means an obligation to accept Alberta’s preferred terms or even to ensure that secession occurs.
Contrary to what separatist leaders contend, Alberta cannot secede unilaterally from Canada. We would have to negotiate our way out of Confederation. Secession itself would require a constitutional amendment involving consent from the federal government and provincial legislatures. If separatists claim that routine constitutional amendments are impossible, securing a secession deal would be even more difficult and time-consuming.
Even an agreement in principle would require precisely the same motion to be passed in all 10 legislatures and the House of Commons within three years. The actual transition would take years more. If they manage to resolve treaty disputes with First Nations (which is a quagmire unto itself), governments would have to create, replace, or share institutions; maintain public services and legal continuity; allocate debt and assets; establish new trade and border arrangements; and seek international recognition and partnerships. This is not something that can be done overnight, especially wheni it involves eleven negotiating partners and Indigenous governments.
The uncertainty during this phase would continue to wreak havoc on the Alberta and Canadian economies as other countries and international investors assess whether the new states can govern, trade, borrow, and protect their citizens.
Option B is not a harmless way to “keep the door open” to independence, or to “send Ottawa a message.” Rather, it is a vote to put the province into constitutional limbo: years of Crown-Indigenous conflict, consultations, court cases, campaigns, and internal party warfare over a departure whose terms cannot be known in advance.
Worse yet, Alberta would spend those years trying to renegotiate the benefits it already enjoys -- access to a national market, shared public programs, national defense, mobility rights, and international reputation -- with no guarantee of retaining them and every possibility of paying more for less.
Opposing Option B requires more than a shrug. Frustrated federalists who want to continue leading Confederation will need to campaign for that side, donate to the cause, and turn out to vote on Oct. 19 (or, better yet, earlier through mail-in ballot or advance polls). Sitting this one out until there’s a “real” vote means supporting years of distracted governance and missed opportunities.
Alberta has maximum leverage when shaping national policy through consensus — not as a landlocked province sitting alone at one end of the bargaining table.
Option A wouldn’t end discussions over Alberta’s relationship with the rest of Canada. Confederation has always been a work in progress and Alberta should continue to press its interests forcefully. But the province negotiates from a position of strength when it builds coalitions to shape national policy, not when it isolates itself against ten other governments.
Choosing Option A allows Alberta to continue the hard work of strengthening our province and country in an uncertain world — to continue to lead, not leave.
Jared Wesley is a professor of political science and leads the Common Ground project at the University of Alberta. He is part of the Lead Not Leave initiative (leadnotleave.ca). Patricia Paradis is the former Executive Director, Centre for Constitutional Studies, University of Alberta. Now retired. Supporter of the Lead Not Leave initiative.
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