Mitch Heimpel: A short history of our F-35 debacle
Canada intends to buy the jets it intended to buy before pledging not to buy.
By: Mitch Heimpel
The news that Canada intends to buy the F-35 fighter jet, almost 12 years after it first announced that it intends to buy the F-35 fighter jet, might actually be the most Justin Trudeau thing Justin Trudeau has ever done.
Canada’s investment in what was initially called the "Joint Strike Fighter" program actually started under the Liberals. The program has undeniably run into major, embarrassing development problems, but began as a pretty good concept. The NATO alliance had just undertaken a series of air campaigns over Bosnia in the five years between 1992 and 1997, which included air-to-air combat and strikes on ground targets. These missions, both in the air and on the ground, revealed stark discrepancies between the capabilities of the various allied militaries in the wake of the end of the Cold War. Interoperability of alliance forces became a necessary focus. A jet that would be used in large numbers by the United States and across the alliance was an obvious advantage.
The Harper government doubled down on what would become the F-35 in September of 2006 when it signed Canada on to the Memorandum of Understanding for the "production, sustainment, and follow-on development" of the project. Our co-signatories on the MOU were, unsurprisingly, our closest allies (the United States, United Kingdom and Australia), along with other NATO allies. The cost was a half-billion dollars, which was then — and still is — basically a rounding error in the federal budget. In exchange, Canadian companies would get a piece of the development work for the jets; to date, this has accounted for about half a billion dollars being spent in Canada. (It did not obligate us to buy the jets.)
All of these steps to this point were surprisingly forward-looking on the part of successive Canadian governments. Surprising, because they seemed a total change from how we had done military procurement — mostly by avoiding it — since the late sixties.
As early as 2008, the Department of National Defence was telling the government that the F-35 was the only plane that could do what our air force needed a fighter jet to do. They continued to do this for seven more years. Almost 14 years ago we were all told this was the only plane that fit our needs as a next generation fighter aircraft. A child born when the memo to report that conclusion was delivered is now a teenager.
When we announced plans for an order of 65 F-35s in 2010, that should have been the end of it. All the lessons of past procurement disasters should have told everyone with any serious aspirations of national leadership that reversing this contract could cripple an air force that was already flying planes past their best-before date. Instead we got five years of hand-wringing that put on display the worst of Ottawa's ability to talk only to itself. It started under the Harper government; stung by criticism over the cost and accusations it had rushed to sole-source the deal, the Conservatives wavered, and then folded: they cancelled the plan to buy the 65 F-35s and chose to hold a competition instead. In the next election, the Trudeau Liberals ran against purchasing the F-35, won the election, and did nothing to pick an alternate successor plane, as the CF-18s got older and older.
This continued for seven years. Bringing us to today.
If you’re looking for a simple meta-explanation for all of us, it would be this: Canadian politicians refuse to tell the public one simple truth — military procurement is expensive. There isn't an inexpensive version of this. That doesn't mean we should accept any and all costs just because it's going to be expensive. It does mean that politicians have to stop trying to sell us on there being an inexpensive, or perfect, version of this. There is no MacGyver version of military procurement. No amount of rubber bands and paper clips replaces jet engines and submarines, no matter how many times we pretend it will. Indeed, the longer you delay, the more it’ll cost — the weapons generally get more expensive, and you end up spending more money to wring every last bit of use out of what equipment you already have, instead of replacing it in an efficient, orderly way.
So, let’s recap: We are, in fact, so bad at procurement that we ran a process for years, and then cancelled it. And then pledged not to buy the jets we’d originally pleged to buy. We then bought seven old Australian F-18s so we could keep our elderly and dwindling CF-18 fleet from experiencing a "capability gap" caused mostly by not just buying the F-35 in the first place. Then, almost 12 years after announcing we were going to buy the F-35, after all the drama above, we’ve announced we’ll buy the F-35, after all. Eighty eight of them, in fact. So there’s that, I guess.
In so many ways, the F-35 saga is another symbol of seven years of Trudeau governance. In 2015, the Liberals could not have been more clear in their campaign platform, which included a whole section titled "We will not buy the F-35 stealth bomber-fighter."
What were Ministers Anand and Tassi out saying when the F-35 announcement was made this week? "Best plane" and "best price." Which was true in 2008 when we were first told it was the only fighter that met our needs. It was still true when the Harper government blinked in 2012, and still true when Justin Trudeau was accusing the government of "whipping out” our CF-18s while on the opposition benches in 2014. Remained true in 2015 when the Liberals campaigned against it, too, and every year since.
We have no reason to believe that what is supposed to be a $19-billion announcement for 88 planes to begin delivery in 2025 will actually end up being any of those things. Don’t be surprised if we spend more money to get fewer jets at a later date. But we are now well past the point of being able to blame anyone other than ourselves for cost overruns or late deliveries. The Canadian government failed the Royal Canadian Air Force in this procurement. That is beyond dispute. These guys need the planes. They have for years.
Let's hope we've at least been sufficiently embarrassed by this experience to be more serious when we have to talk about submarines, which is now, come to think of it.
But I doubt it.
Mitch Heimpel has served cabinet ministers and party leaders at the provincial and federal levels, and is currently the director of campaigns and government relations at Enterprise Canada.
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